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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
accident had aggravated a pre-existing condition of the claimant's shoulder, it
would then have been in keeping with prior decisions to hold that the industrial
accident should bear the entire cost of the required operation.' 6 The Board did
not, however, find any aggravation, and both the Appellate Division and the
Court of Appeals indicated that such a holding was reasonable from the
evidence adduced at the hearing.
Similarly, if the employee had had a permanent disability when he was
hired by the defendant employer he should have been allowed full compensa-
tion for the subsequent operation under the provisions of Section 15 Subdivi-
sion 8.17 According to the Board's findings as accepted by both Courts, he
was not, however, permanently disabled at the time of his hiring by the
defendant employer. Neither did the Court find it unreasonable for the Board
to apportion the costs of the operation equally between the six injuries which
had combined to require it. In the past, in the absence of special circumstances
to substantiate a different apportionment, equal apportionment has been the
rule applied.18
It thus appears that while there is no precedent for the Board's award
in the Engle case, there is no statutory provision or case law disallowing it.
For this reason the Court's acceptance of the findings and determination of the
Board statutorily charged with the administration of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law is justified. 19
COMPENSATION AwAD FOLLOWING SECOND INDUsTRIAL DISABILITY
Section 15(5) of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law provides
that in case of temporary partial disability resulting in a decrease of earning
capacity, the compensation shall be two-thirds of the difference between the
injured employee's weekly wages before the accident and his wage earning
capacity after the accident in the same or another employmentP° Section
15(6) of the same law provides, inter alia, that in no event shall compensa-
tion when combined with decreased earnings or earning capacity exceed the
amount of wages which the employee was receiving at the time the injury
occurred. 21 Where there has been more than one accident, each occurring while
working for a different employer, it has been held that the injury referred to
in Section 15(6) is the one occurring latest in time. 22 Thus, even though the
rate of pay is higher on the second job than on the first, the first employer
must pay his pro rata share based upon the higher rate.23 The theory behind
the rule seems to be that a different interpretation would permit prior em-
16. Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., 216 N.Y. 712, 111 N.E. 1099 (1915).
17. Mastrodonato v. Pfaudler Co., 307 N.Y. 592, 123 N.E.2d 83 (1954).
18. Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra note 15; Fitchner v. Bloomingdale
Bros., supra note 15. Conklin v. Arden Farms Dairy Co., 3 N.Y.2d 860, 166 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1957).
19. N.Y. WoRxma N's ComP. LAW § 20.
20. N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW § 15(5).
21. Id. § 15(6).
22. Meszaros v. Goldman, 307 N.Y. 296, 121 N.E.2d 232 (1954).
23. Ibid.
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ployers who have contributed to the ultimate disability to be relieved of all
money contributions simply because the claimant's wages have risen.
In the recently decided case of In re Crawley's Claim,2 4 the Court of
Appeals had occasion to limit the rule so that it is inapplicable in the converse
situation, i.e., where the subsequent pay rate is lower than in that at the time
of the prior injury.
The claimant had been a beautician and became disabled in 1947 due to
an occupational disease. At this time she was earning $57 per week. She left
her job and found employment as a manicurist at $40 per week and received
compensation based upon the difference between the two pay scales. In 1954,
she was again disabled by the same occupational disease and was awarded
compensation by the Board based upon earnings of $57, i.e., her $40 salary
plus the amount of her compensation. 25 The Board made a supplemental de-
cision in 1957 affirming its original determination on the theory that in suc-
cessive industrial accidents, each contributing to the claimant's ultimate disa-
bility, the compensation should be based on claimant's highest weekly wage
in any of the contributing accidents. The Appellate Division affirmed, but on
the theory that the term "wages" included the $17 compensation, therefore
the amount of the award was not violative of Section 15(6).20 In reversing
the award, the Court of Appeals determined that both theories relied upon
below were incorrect. As to the inclusion of the prior compensation award in
the term "wages," the Court pointed out that the term is precisely defined in
Section 2(9) of the Workmen's Compensation Law.27 In regard to the propo-
sition of the Board that the weekly average wage should be based upon the
highest rate under any of the contributing injuries, the Court specifically
limited its prior holding to that given fact situation, i.e., where the wages
are higher on the job where the last injury occurred2 8
The decision in the instant case appears to be a sound one. As for the
Court's interpretation of "wages," the weight of authority seems to be that in
order for something to qualify for that characteristic under Workmen's Com-
pensation statutes, there should be something of value received as considera-
tion for the work; e.g. tips and bonuses. 29
As to the limitation of the weekly average wage to that rate received on
the job where the last injury occurred, there are two possible justifications.
In the first place, the rule permitting the above situation is based on the
24. 6 N.Y.2d 57, 188 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1959).
25. The Court points out that the figure of $17 is plainly incorrect as it amounts
to the full difference between the wages rather than two-thirds. The distinction has no
effect, however, on the reasoning of the Court.
26. In re Crawley's Claim, 5 A.D.2d 896, 171 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't 1958).
27. N.Y. WoPxa'mN's CoM. LAW § 2(9).
Wages means the money rate at which the service rendered is recom-
pensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident,
including the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging or
similar advantage received from the employer....
28. Supra note 22.
29. LAasoN, WoRxzmx's ComENSATiON LAW § 60.12.
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theory that to hold contra would permit prior employers to escape their
share of liability for the injury. Where the last rate is smaller than the prior
one, there is no possibility that the amount received as compensation will
exceed the total amount of wages received on the last job, thus the prior
employer will have to pay his pro rata share. Another justification may be
based upon one of the public policies behind Workmen's Compensation laws.
For example, Section 15(8) which provides for a special disability fund to be
set up by the state, declares that
any plan which will reasonably, equitably and practically operate to
break down hinderances, and remove obstacles to the employment
of partially disabled persons honorably discharged from our armed
forces, or any other physically handicapped persons, is of vital im-
portance to the state and its people and is of concern to this legis-
lature.30
Applying that policy to the instant case, if a prospective employer felt
that he might be forced to contribute compensation at a higher rate for a
person who has been disabled on a higher paying previous job than he pays
for his other employees, then there would be a natural hesitation in hiring
such people.8 ' In the instant case, the Court of Appeals has helped to carry
out the policy announced above.
REOPENING OF PREVIOUSLY DENIED CLAIM
Section 123 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law provides that
the Workmen's Compensation Board shall have continuing jurisdiction to
modify its decisions and awards, but that no claim that has once been disal-
lowed shall be reopened after seven years from the date of the accident or
death upon which the claim is based.
32
In Stimburis v. Leviton Mfg. Co. 33 the Court of Appeals confined the
application of Section 123. In this case a claim based upon disability due to
silicosis was dismissed by the Workmen's Compensation Board in 1944.34 The
dismissal was grounded upon the written report of a member of the Board's
impartial chest panel, which stated that claimant was not totally disabled.
3 5
Four months later, claimant filed an application for a reopening of the case,
which was denied. Ten years later in 1954, the case was reopened and another
30. N.Y. WoRxaEN's CowP. LAw § 15(8).
31. This of course would be reflected in higher insurance premiums rather than in
direct payments.
32. N.Y. WORKMEN'S Coau'. LAW § 123 provides that the jurisdiction of the board as
to each case shall be continuing, except that "no claim for compensation or for death
benefits that has been disallowed after a trial on the merits, or that has been otherwise
disposed of without an award after the parties in interest have been given due notice of
hearing or hearings and opportunity to be heard and for which no determination was made
on the merits, shall be reopened after a lapse of seven years from the date of the accident
or death."
33. 5 N.Y.2d 360, 184 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1959).
34. Wo axarN's ComnP. LAW § 3(2) Col. 1 No. 28.
35. N.Y. WoRxmEN's Coam. LAW § 66 provides that compensation shall not be paya-
able for partial disability due to silicosis.
